Administrative Circular No. 39-2020, Re: Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine in Certain Areas until 31 May 2020

Photo by Mark Z. Saludes/Rappler 

On May 14, 2020, the Supreme Court through Chief Justice Diosdado Peralta issued Administrative Circular No 39-2020 to all litigants, Judges and Court Personnel of the Judiciary, and Members of the Bar, pertaining to the Modified Enhanced Community Quarantine in Certain Areas until 31 May, 2020.

Salient points of the said Circular are as follows:

1. All the courts in the areas under MECQ shall remain physically closed to all court users until 31 May 2020, and may initially reached only through their respective hotline numbers, email addresses and/or Facebook accounts as posted on the website of the Supreme Court. All inquiries on cases or transactions, including requests for documents and services, shall be coursed and acted upon only through the said number, addresses, and accounts of the concerned court, or through the Judiciary Public Assistance Section of the Supreme Court in accordance with A.C. 28-2020. No walk-in requests shall be entertained on any of the offices of the courts in the said areas.

2. While all courts in areas under MECQ shall remain physically closed to all court users, these courts shall continue to operate from 9:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Monday to Friday until 29 May 2020. All electronic communication, however, must be transmitted to and received by these courts from 8:30 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. for these transactions to be acted upon on the same day.

3. The raffle of cases in all courts in areas under MECQ shall proceed either electronically or through videoconferencing. Accordingly, the judge/justices-on-duty arrangement, together with their respective skeleton-staff, pursuant to A.C. 31-2020 and A.C. 32-2020, is hereby discontinued. However, in the exigency of the service, justices, judges, and court officials, together with their respective skeleton-staff, may go to their respective courts.

4. The filing of petitions, appeals, complaints, motions, pleadings and other submissions that fall due up to 31 May 2020 before the courts in areas under MECQ is extended for 30 calendar days, counted from 1 June 2020, but pleadings and other court submissions may still be filed by the parties within the reglementary period on or before 31 May 2020 through electronic means, if preferred and able. In the same manner, the periods for court actions with prescribed periods of courts in areas under MECQ are likewise extended for 30 calendar days counted from 1 June 2020.

5. Civil weddings may be solemnized, provided the parties, witnesses and guests shall not exceed five (5), as provided in the Guidelines on the Phased Transition from ECQ to GCQ and health hygiene protocols and other public medical standards, e.g. wearing of face masks and face shields, subjecting everyone to no-contact thermal scanning, and observance of social distancing, shall be strictly observed during the ceremony.

6. All official meetings, seminars, trainings, and other functions in the judiciary within the MECQ areas, unless conducted through videoconferencing, are deferred until after 31 May 2020, except those that may be called or authorized by the Chief Executive by the judiciary Task Force on COVID-19.

7. Flag raising and retreat ceremonies in area under the MECQ shall remain suspended until 31 May 2020.

SUPREME COURT

8. The Supreme Court shall continue to receive petitions and pleadings electronically, and in accordance with herein paragraphs 1 and 2, and processes the same in accordance with the Internal Rules of Court.

9. The decision-writing period of the Court is hereby extended until 31 May 2020. The Court may however, hold special en banc and division sessions anytime it may deem fit, either in-person or through videoconferencing.

x x x x x

COURT OF APPEALS, SANDIGANBAYAN, COURT OF TAX APPEALS

11. The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals shall likewise continue to receive petitions and pleadings electronically, and in accordance with herein paragraphs 1 and 2, and process the same pursuant to their respective internal rules.

12. The Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals shall likewise continue to resolve and decide cases pending before them. Regular hearings shall be conducted through videoconferencing. Considering that Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals are likewise trial courts, they shall adopt the procedures herein provided in paragraphs 17 and 18, in so far as they are applicable.

x x x x x

REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, FAMILY COURTS, AND FIRST LEVEL COURTS

16. ALL initiatory pleadings, in both civil and criminal cases, including criminal complaints, informations, and applications for bail (pursuant to A.C. 33-2020 dated 31 March 2020, supplemented by OCA Circular No. 89-2020, dated 3 April 2020), together with all the required documents in relation thereto may be filed electronically and shall be received by the Regional Trial Courts, Family Courts, and First Level Courts through their respective official email addresses, as posted on the website of the Supreme Court. Pleadings and other court submissions on pending cases may be electronically filed directly with the branch where the case is pending, if the said branch has an official email address. Otherwise, the pleadings and other court submissions on pending cases may be filed electronically with the Office of the Clerk of Court, which shall forward the said transmissions to the branches where the cases are pending.

17. ALL courts initially authorized to hear through videoconferencing only urgent matters in criminal cases involving Persons Deprived of Liberty are now herein authorized to hear through videoconferencing ALL matters pending before them, in both criminal and civil cases, whether newly-filed or pending regardless of the stage of trial. The videoconferencing hearings in both criminal and civil cases shall be upon joint motion of the parties, or upon orders of the court, which shall schedule the said videoconferencing hearings.

Under exceptional circumstances, in-court hearings may likewise be conducted by courts authorized to conduct hearings through videoconferencing.

For courts which are not authorized to conduct hearings through videoconferencing, in-court hearings conducted by the presiding judge, assisted by the skeleton-staff, shall be limited to urgent matter and other concerns to expedite the proceedings, both in criminal and civil cases. The judges shall see to it that the counsels and parties are duly notified of the in-court hearings to ensure their attendance.

In all in-court heatings, health hygiene protocols and other public medical standards, e.g. wearing of face masks and face shields, subjecting everyone to no-contact thermal scanning, observance of social distancing, shall be strictly observed.

18. The taking of the testimony of a witness in a place other than where the court is, through videoconferencing, is akin to the taking of a deposition upon oral examination, pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 23, as amended, and shall be allowed. If the witness will be testifying on (i) duly subscribed written statements given to law enforcement or peace officers, or (ii) affidavits or counter-affidavits submitted before the investigating prosecutor, or (iii) judicial affidavits, subject to additional direct and cross-examination questions, the said documents and affidavits must be received by the court and the parties through electronic transmission in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence, at least three (3) days prior to the scheduled videoconferencing hearing.

19. Night courts and Saturday courts in areas under MECQ shall remain suspended until 31 May 2020.

20. All judges presiding in courts in MECQ areas shall continue to draft decisions and orders in their respective residences until 31 May 2020, which decisions may be promulgated or issued once the courts are fully operations, except decisions and order or urgent matter which shall be promulgated or issued during the MECQ period.

All previously issued circulars and their respective provisions which are not inconsistent herewith shall remain valid and in effect.

for ready reference, see full-text of the Circular below:

SC Circular 39-2020 (Page 1)

SC Circular 39-202 (Page 2)

SC Circular 39-2020 (Page 3)

SC Circular 39-2020 (Page 4)

SC Circular 39-2020 (Page 5)

Civil Law; Contracts; when there is a close, proximate, and causal connection between the broker’s efforts and the principal’s sale of his property—or joint venture agreement, in this case—the broker is entitled to a commission

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ROBERTO R. IGNACIO and TERESA R. IGNACIO doing business under the name and style TERESA R. IGNACIO ENTERPRISES vs. MYRNA P. RAGASA and AZUCENA B. ROA,

G.R. No. 227896, Jan. 29. 2020, Justice Peralta

FACTS:

On January 11, 2000, petitioners (Ignacio) engaged, on an exclusive basis, the services of the respondents, who are both licenses real estate brokers, to look for and negotiate with a person or entity for a joint venture project involving petitioners’ undeveloped lands in Mindanao Avenue, Quezon City and the developed subdivision sites in Las Piñas City, Parañaque City, and Bacoor. The contract was embodied in the Authority to Look and Negotiate for a Joint Venture Partner, effective six months from January 10, 2000, or until July 10, 2000. The said Authority provided that the petitioners will pay the respondents a commission equivalent to five percent (5%) of the price of the properties.

On January 13, 2000, respondents met with Mr. Porfirio Yusingbo, Jr. (Yusingbo), the General Manager of Woodridge Properties, Inc. (Woodridge), and they presented him the different subdivisions and project sites available for investment. After inspecting the properties, Yusingbo expressed Woodridge’s interest in acquiring and developing the Krause Park and Teresa Park properties.

As a result, Woodridge sent respondents a formal proposal dated January 21, 2000 for a joint venture agreement with the petitioners covering the Teresa Park. The proposal was sent by the respondents to the petitioners via facsimile. On January 25, 2000, the petitioners met with the representative of Woodridge to discuss the prices of the properties, and Woodridge likwise intimated that it would develop both the Krause Park and the Teresa Park.

On February 4, 2000, respondents met again with Yusingbo and Mr. Elmer Loredo (Loredo), Woodridge’s broker, to discuss Woodridge’s proposal for bulk puchase covering the Teresa Park, including the terms of payment. On February 9, 2000, respondents presented Woodridge’s offer to petitioner Robert Ignacio. They discussed the projected cash inflows and the advantages of the scheme. Petitioner Ignacio said he wanted to sell the lots in batches at a lower volume, instead of in bulk. Respondents communicated the offer to Woodridge and the latter intimated that it will make a revised offer. On March 9, 2000, Woodridge, however, changed its offer from direct acquisition to joint venture, covering 200 lots in Teresa Park, and sent the proposal to the respondents, who, in turn, relayed it to the petitioners. In a meeting on March 13, 2000, petitioners and respondents discussed the proposal for joint venture. Petitioners commented that Woodridge’s offer was too low, but respondents reassured them that the could negotiate for a better price. After this March 13, 2000 meeting, however, petitioners stopped communicating with the respondents. Several attempts were made by the respondents to contact the petitioners to follow-up on the proposal of Woodridge, but to no avail.

Sometime thereafter, respondents learned that the petitioners continued to negotiate with Woodridge, and this led to the execution of two joint venture agreements between the petitioners and Woodridge, covering the Krause Park. The two joint venture agreements were notarized on March 7,, 2000 and October 16, 2000.

For the Teresa Park, four joint venture agreements were executed between the petitioners and Woodridge, and these were notarized on December 6, 2000, March 12, 2001, September 25, 2001, and October 1, 2002. Aside from the joint venture agreements, several deeds of sale were also executed between the petitioners and Woodridge, and these are dated September 24, 2001 and August 25, 2003.

Per respondent’s estimate, petitioners earned Php 26,068,000.00 and Php 22,497,000.00 for the sale of the Krause Park and Teresa Park projects, respectively. Respondents demanded payment of their commission from the petitioners, contending that the joint venture agreements and the sales over the Krause and Teresa Park were products of their successful negotiation with Woodridge. Petitioners, however, refused to pay despite demand. Thus, respondents filed a complaint for sum of money, damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City.

In their Answer, petitioners denied that they have an obligation to pay the respondents. Petitioners contend that the respondents offered their services as exclusive real estate brokers, but they were never engaged. Petitioners further state that they were not looking for an exclusive agency and they entertained brokers on a “first come, first served” basis. Petitioners, likewise, contend that they were not agreeable with the respondent’s proposal to sell the lots below the prevailing market value with no escalation clause, and that the sale of the Krause Park and the Teresa Park was made through the joint efforts of their Consultants, Engr. Julius Aragon and Florence Cabansang. No sales transaction was realized on account of the respondents.

RULING:

In Medrano v. Court of Appeals, it was held that “when there is a close, proximate, and causal connection between the broker’s efforts and the principal’s sale of his property—or joint venture agreement, in this case—the broker is entitled to a commission.”

Here, as aptly ruled by the CA, the proximity in time between the meetings held by the respondents and Woodridge and the subsequent execution of the joint venture agreements leads to a logical conclusion that it was the respondents who brokered it. Likewise, it is inconsequential that the authority of the respondents as brokers had already expired when the joint venture agreements over the subject properties were executed. The negotiation for these transactions began during the effectivity of the authority of the respondents, and these were carried out through their efforts. Thus, the respondents are entitled to a commission.

Link: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/10666/

Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; strict compliance with the procedures laid down under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is required to ensure that rights are safeguarded; Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her: representative or counsel. (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

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People vs. Eric Padua (aka Jerick Padua), 

G.R. No. 239781, Feb. 5, 2020, 

Justice Diosadado Peralta:

FACTS:

The version of the prosecution is that, on February 5, 2009, acting on a tip from an asset, Police Senior Superintendent Elmer Jamias instructed PO2 Hernaez to conduct surveillance in Upper Sucat, Purok 1 Highway and to monitor appellant, who was said to be engaged in selling illegal drugs. Upon verification, PO2 Hernaez confirmed that indeed, appellant was selling illegal drugs.

Thereafter, PO2 Hernaez looked for an asset to help the police buy illegal drugs from appellant. After PO2 Hernaez found an asset to facilitate the transaction, Police Chief Inspector Eduardo Panigbatan directed PO2 Hernaez to act as backup to PO1 Yangson, who would be acting as poseur-buyer.

PO2 Hernaez and the rest of the team prepared a [Pre-] Operational Report and a Coordination Form that was submitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Police Chief Inspector Panigbatan handed the buy-bust money, consisting of one bill worth Two Hundred Pesos (Php 200.00) and another bill worth One Hundred Pesos (Php 100.00). The initials “BY” were placed on the buy-bust money.

Later in the evening, the buy-bust team, composed of PO2 Hernaez, PO1 Yangson, PO3 Gastanes, SPO1 Zamora, PO3, Bornilla, PO3 Villareal, PO2 Salvador Genova, and PO3 Bonifacio Aquino, arrived at Purok 1, Sucat. PO1 Yangson and the asset went to the jeepney terminal along the highway in Upper Sucat, while PO2 Hernaez was positioned ten to fifteen meters away from them.

PO1 Yangson and the asset talked to appellant. Thereafter, appellant handled a plastic sachet to PO1 Yangson, who took the same and, in turn, gave the buy-bust money. At that moment, PO1 Yangson lighted a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal that the transaction was consumated. PO2 Hernaez immediately approached appellant and arrested him. PO1 Yangson showned to PO2 Hernaez a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Afterwards, PO1 Yangson introduced himself as a police officer and informed appellant of his constitutional rights.

After bringing appellant to the police station, the arresting officers conducted an inventory of the item seized during the buy-bust operation. They took a picture of the item seized during the buy-bust operation. They took a picture of the plastic sachet and PO1 Yangson placed the markings “JP” thereon. Thereafter, PO2 Hernaez and PO1 Yangson brought the item to the crime laboratory. The specimen tested positive for the presence of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride. 

The defense, on the other hand, refuted these allegations stating that on February 5, 2009, appellant was on his way out from his house when he met two men, who asked him if he is Jerick Padua. He denied that he is Jerick and said that his name is Eric. One of the men, who was then wearing a white shirt, told him that they are police officer, and that they are inviting him to the police station for questioning.

Believing that he committed no wrong, appellant accepted the invitation of the police officers and went with them.Appellant was then brought to the police office located at the Muntinlupa City Hall. After about thirty minutes, the police officer, who was wearing a white shirt, handed him a document and asked him to sign it. He was told that it was merely for blotter purposes.

When he refused, another police officer punched him and forced him to sign the document. Minutes later, his sister, Lycka Padua, arrived and talked to the police officers. Appellant later learned that the police officers were asking for Twenty Thousand Pesos (Php 20,000.00) from his sister to settle the matter.

Appellant’s sister, Lycka Padua, corroborated appellant’s testimony and averred that she was washing the dishes with her sister Ericka when they heard voices of several men. They peeped through the window and saw these men approach appellant’s house. These men asked her brother, herein appellant, if he is Jerick Padua, conducted a body search on him, and brought him to the city hall. When their father arrived, she told him what happened and she was directed by her father to follow Padua. At the city hall, she saw appellant seated on a bench, handcuffed, and his statement being documented. She then learned that the police officers were charging appellant for selling illegal drugs and was told to post bail for his brother’s liberty. Their family, however, could not raise the amount required.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court handed a guilty verdict on Padua for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the findings of the trial court that the prosecution adequately established all the elements of illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective evidence presented during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Padua resorted to denial and could not present any proof or justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the same.

RULING:

However, the Supreme Court ruled that the appeal is meritorious. Appellant Padua should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 

In prosecution of drug-related cases, the State bears not only the burden of proving these elements, but also of proving the corpus delicti of the body of the crime. The dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti of the violation of the law. Therefore, compliance with the chain of custody rule is crucial. Chain of custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction.

The rule is imperative, as it is essential that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance offered in court as exhibit; and that the identity of said drug is established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. Thus, strict compliance with the procedures laid down under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is required to ensure that rights are safeguarded.

Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires that: (1) the seized items be inventoried and photographed immediately after seizure or confiscation; and (2) that the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of (a) the accused or his/her: representative or counsel. (b) an elected public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate extreme danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-assault. The present case is not one of those.

Here, the physical inventory and photograph of the seized item were not done at the place of the arrest but only at the police station. There was no showing by the prosecution that these were done due to extraordinary circumstances that would threaten the safety and security of the apprehending officers and/or the witnesses required by law or of the items seized.

Moreover, the absence of the witnesses required by law — and elected public official, representative of the DOJ and the media — to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items is glaring. If fact, the signatures do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.

The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro:

The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for noncompliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering or alteration of evidence.

It must be alleged and proved that the presence of three witnesses to the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:

1. their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.

Ernest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos requires:

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for “a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse.” Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for noncompliance. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their actions were reasonable.

The prosecution miserably failed to explain why the police officers did not secure the presence of an elected public official, a representative from the DOJ, and the media. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish that there was earnest effort to coordinate with and secure the presence of required witnesses.

Thus, it cannot be denied that serious breaches of the mandatory procedures required by law in the conduct of buy-bust operations were committed by the police. These cast serious doubt as to the integrity of the allegedly confiscated drug specimen, hence creating reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant Padua.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the April 6, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 07432, which affirmed the February 26, 2015 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 09-096, finding accused-appellant Eric Alvarez Padua, a.k.a. Jerick Alvarez Padua, guilty of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Eric Alvarez Padua, a.k.a. Jerick Alvarez Padua, is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully held for another case.

link: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/10827/

Political Law; Eminent Domain; Determination of Just Compensation; if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects, which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land

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National Transmission Corporation vs. Spouses Taglao

G.R. No. 223195, January 29, 2020, Justice Inting

FACTS:

The National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) is the transferee-in-interest of the NPC—a government entity created to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and production of electricity from any and all sources. To carry out its purpose, NPC was given authority by Republic Act No. (RA) 6395 to enter and acquire private properties.

To enable it to construct and maintain its Tayabas-Dasmariñas 500 KV Transmission Line Project, the NPC, on November 24, 1995, filed before the RTC a Complaint for Eminent Domain against the spouses Mariano and Corazon Taglao (Spouses Taglao). The Spouses Taglao are the owners of a parcel of land covering an area of 5,143 square meters situated at San Pioquinto, Malvar, Batangas. The NPC sought to acquire an easement of right of way over the 3,573 sq.m portion (subject portion) of Spouses Taglao’s property.

Spouses Taglao moved to dismiss the eminent domain case filed by the NPC. Meanwhile, the NPC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the subject property. The motion to dismiss was denied, and granted the NPC’s Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession over the subject portion of Spouses Taglao’s property, and thereafter declared as condemned the subject property.

The RTC fixed the market value of the property at Php 1,000.00 per square meter. 

Aggrieved, the NPC appealed before the CA. The CA then denied NPC’s appeal and affirmed in toto the RTC’s ruling.

RULING:

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. It is the sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as price to be given and received therefor. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss.

While market value may be one of the basis in the determination of just compensation, the same cannot be arbitrarily arrived at without considering the factors to be appreciated in arriving at the fair market value of the property, e.g., the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that just compensation should be computed based on fair market value of the property at the time of its taking or the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first.

Here, the action for eminent domain was filed by the NPC on November 24, 1995. By virtue of the writ issued in favor of the NPC, it took possession of the subject property on October 9, 1996. Since the filing of the Complaint for Eminent Domain came ahead of the taking, just compensation should be based on fair market value of Spouses Taglao’s property at the time of the filing of the NPC’s Complaint on November 24, 1995.

In this case, the valuation recommended by the commissioner for the NPC was Php 13.607 per square meter. The valuation was based on the market value stated on the property’s Tax Declaration for December 29, 1993. The commissioner for Spouses Taglao, on the other hand, recommended a valuation of Php 2,500.00 per square meter. This amount was in turn based on the market value of the property as of August 15, 2000.

The Supreme Court stated that it cannot uphold the valuations made by the respective commissioners as they were not based on the market value of the property at the time of the filing of NPC’s complaint for eminent domain on November 24, 1995. The market value of the subject property could have been different on 1993 and in 2000. Moreover, the valuation of the commissioner for the NPS was arrived at by considering only the property’s tax declaration, without taking into account other relevant factors, such as the property’s cost acquisition, the value of like properties in 1995, its size, share, and location.

A simple reading of the CA’s Decision would signify that its conclusion was highly speculative and devoid of any actual and reliable basis. Although the determination of just compensation indeed lies within the trial court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The valuation of courts must be base on all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The courts are proscribed from basing their judgments on speculations and surmises. The findings of both the RTC and the CA not being based on well grounded data, it is incumbent upon the Court to disregard them.

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In several cases, the Court struck down reliance on Section 3A of RA 6395, as amended by PD No. 938. True, as easement of a right of way transmits no rights except the easement itself, and the respondents would retain full ownership of the property taken. Nonetheless, the acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The limitations on the use of the property taken for an indefinite period would deprive its owner of the normal use thereof. For this reason, the latter is entitled to a payment of a just compensation, which must be either more or less than the monetary equivalent of the land taken.

Citing the case of National Power Corporation v. Tiangco, the Court in National Power Corporation v. Sps. Asoque elucidated:

While the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession of the expropriated property, no cogent reason appears why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property, without loss of title and possession. However, if the easement is intended to perpetually or indefinitely deprive the owner of his proprietary rights through the imposition of conditions that affect the ordinary use, free enjoyment and disposal of the property or through restrictions and limitations that are inconsistent with the exercise of the attributes of ownership, or when the introduction of structures or objects, which, by their nature, create or increase the probability of injury, death upon or destruction of life and property found on the land is necessary, then the owner should be compensated for the monetary equivalent of the land, x x x. 

In this case, the TRANSCO needed to acquire easement on the subject property to enable it to construct and maintain its Tayabas-Dasmariñas 500 KV Transmission Line Project. Certainly the high-tension current to be conveyed through said transmission lines poses danger to life and limb; or possible injury, death or destruction to life and property within the vicinity. Considering that the installation of the power lines would definitely deprive Spouses Taglao of the normal use of their property, they are entitled to the payment of a just compensation, which is neither more nor less than the monetary equivalent of the subject property.

In view of the foregoing, the computation by the RTC of the just compensation should be done using the following formula:

Just Compensation = Total Market Value x Area Affected

                                                 Total Area

The subject property’s market  value should be fixed by the RTC taking into consideration the cost of acquisition of the land involved, the current value of like properties, its size, shape, location, as well as the tax declarations thereon, at the time of the filing of the NPC’s complaint.

In light of the foregoing, the Court sets aside the Decision and the Resolution of the CA. The Court has not alternative but to remand the case to the court of origin for the proper determination of the just compensation.